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ABSTRACT
If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are
numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic
utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are considered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms
of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these
three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitudebased approach inspired by Diamond’s view (though different from
it in important ways) is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by
focusing moral attention on the attitudes of agents as opposed to the
actions they undertake, captures the important insights of all three
views, while offering a better grounding for the obligation. This view
is superior in that it (1) succeeds in explaining the wrongness of a
problem case, (2) without committing one to rights or to a troublingly
subjective understanding of moral concepts.
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1. Introduction
It is usually acknowledged that non-human animals can be
the proper objects of moral concern. The question of which
non-human animals are the proper objects of that concern is not
settled, nor is the question of the constraints that that moral concern puts on behavior; however, it is usually granted that there
are ways in which it is wrong to treat some non-human beings.
Torturing kittens, for example, is generally acknowledged to be
wrong. What is interesting is that eating non-human animals is
not always (or even often) thought to be one of the prohibited
ways of treating them. Although there are those who argue that
it is morally impermissible to eat non-human animals (Singer
1974 and 2002; Regan 2004; Norcross 2004; McMahan 2008),
it is by no means the standard view. Furthermore, among those
who do argue for vegetarianism, there is disagreement as to the
scope and ground of the obligation involved. Some argue that
sentient animals have a right to freedom from harm that is violated by raising them for food and killing them (Regan 2004),
while others argue that it is primarily the pain and suffering that
accompany animal industries that renders them impermissible
(Singer 2002). Like any practical question in moral philosophy,
theoretical commitments shape the answers that are given to
the question, and the success of those answers is a function
of the strength of the underlying theory. In this paper, the virtues and vices of representative arguments for vegetarianism
will be discussed, and an alternative to these arguments will be
proposed. Although there is much to recommend both standard
utilitarian and rights-based arguments for vegetarianism, it will
be argued that the important insights of both can be better accommodated by an attitude-based argument rather than by the
standard act-based arguments.
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2. Standard Views
Among those who advocate for vegetarianism (both philosophers and non-philosophers alike), some form of utilitarianism is the most common explanatory ground (Singer 1974 and
2002; Norcross 2004; Pollan 2007; Robbins 1987). The reason
for this is not surprising; raising, killing, and eating sentient
creatures involves causing their deaths, and in many cases
causing pain to them, and so it is intuitively plausible that this
needs to be justified. If one is drawn to vegetarianism it is often because, when attempting to justify this pain, one weighs it
against whatever reasons one has for causing it and finds that
such reasons do not offer justification. This lack of justification
is even clearer in our modern society, which causes more than
just the pain and the loss of future pleasure that result from
killing non-human animals (or, the frustration of an interest in,
or preference for, remaining alive, depending on one’s view),
but immense pain and suffering in their pre-slaughter lives as
well. The simple fact of pain and suffering provides a compelling reason to remove oneself from participation in the institution that causes it, and so many people who abstain from eating
meat do so for this reason.
The obvious intuitive appeal of such arguments (surely it
is better not to cause pain and suffering if one can help it!),
coupled with the indisputable fact of the pain and suffering
caused to non-human animals in animal industries (Singer
2002), provides a solid base for arguing that vegetarianism
is morally obligatory. However, despite the intuitive appeal
of this view, there are problems with utilitarian justifications
of vegetarianism. These problems have largely to do with the
identification of the value that one is morally obligated to promote. The problem can be illustrated with a somewhat fanciful
science fiction example: Imagine that one of the major chicken
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restaurants, having received much flak for undercover footage of the abusive treatment of the chickens it raises, decides
to breed a whole new kind of chicken. This chicken will look
and taste exactly like the chickens that we are used to, but it
will specifically be bred to feel no pain and have no conscious
awareness. In essence, the chickens will be very much like seriously brain-damaged chickens, but in the case of this breed, the
brain-damage will be the norm. What could possibly be wrong
with this, on a utilitarian view? The chickens are incapable of
suffering or having interests, so no matter how one treats them,
that treatment cannot be wrong; the chickens are, in essence,
meat plants.
Of course, it is open to a utilitarian proponent of vegetarianism to argue that nothing would be wrong with breeding, raising, killing, and eating such chickens. However, this position
highlights one of the unsatisfactory features of utilitarianism
(Regan 2004, 200-211). Utilitarianism focuses its theoretical
attention on individuals as loci of morally salient experiences,
which is one of the reasons it successfully grounds obligations
to non-human animals. No matter what the nature of the individual, if it suffers, that suffering matters morally, and the
individual matters as a source of suffering. However, one only
matters morally as such a source (since it is the suffering alone
that is morally salient), so any individual that fails to be (or
ceases to be) such a source does not matter morally. Treatment
of individuals matters because those individuals suffer, so if
one abstracts the capacity for suffering, the individuals do not
matter.
Many proponents of utilitarianism find this feature of it particularly appealing—on their view, it is sentimentalism (at best)
or speciesism (at worst) to think that non-sentient individuals
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matter morally simply because they look like individuals that
are sentient, or because they would have been sentient without
defect. Given this feature of the utilitarian view, there seems to
be no wrongness involved in the chicken example. However,
there is reason to think that something is going wrong here;
this example involves the deliberate attempt to circumvent
what is morally salient about an individual in order to remove
one’s obligations to it, and such behavior is intuitively suspect.
Consider, for example, that it would seem a bad defense for
killing a person to point out that when you killed him, he was
brain-damaged from the blow to the head you gave him first,
and thus no longer a proper object of moral duties. Even if the
subsequent treatment of the individual cannot be considered
wrong, there must be an explanation of the moral dubiousness
of acting in this way, and it seems unlikely that this will be a
utilitarian explanation. The most promising utilitarian explanation seems to be that doing this would make one more likely to
disregard the interests of chickens that are sentient, thus causing more suffering in the long run (Singer 2002)—but it seems
that even one instance of this manipulation, done in isolation
from any other chickens, is morally amiss. If, on the other hand,
one attempts to argue that there is nothing wrong with acting in
this way, then the example could be easily altered to describe
genetically altered, non-sentient human beings, with the same
moral conclusion.
Hard-line utilitarians might argue that there would be nothing
wrong with eating human beings that had been bred to be nonsentient from birth. But there is something morally troubling
about trying to engineer individuals that lack the one feature
that gives rise to their moral status so that one can treat them
as objects that have none. In what follows, it will be argued
that this sort of behavior is wrong because it displays a morally
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deficient attitude towards sentient beings. First, however, two
non-utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism will be considered,
in order to illustrate the need for the alternative view.
If one is not a utilitarian, the most common alternative reason given for vegetarianism is rights-based; it is a violation of
the rights of non-human animals to raise and kill them for food
(Regan 2004). According to rights-based arguments, the reason
it is wrong to eat meat is not simply the fact that the production of it causes suffering and death, but that the imposition of
such suffering and death are violations of the rights of the nonhuman animals involved.
Tom Regan argues for such a view, and his arguments are
Kant-inspired, though he rejects the Kantian grounding of morality in autonomous moral legislation. According to Regan,
any being that is a subject of a life (where this means that one
has a point of view from which life can go better or worse for
one) has basic moral rights, because all such subjects have inherent value, worth, and dignity over and above their use to
others. Included in these basic moral rights is the right not to
be harmed. Given what goes on in the animal agriculture industry, raising and killing non-human animals for food (or keeping
them in order to lay eggs or give milk) is clearly a violation of
their rights.
Rights-based views provide more stringent prohibitions on
the same sorts of behavior that utilitarian views prohibit. However, in order to achieve this stringency, proponents of such
views posit rights, and this in turn raises worries about the nature and existence of moral rights themselves. To take Regan’s
view, one might wonder if all subjects of lives have inherent
value, and whether that inherent value gives rise to rights. How

© Between the Species, 2014

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 17, Issue 1

59
Elizabeth Foreman

does a fact of value generate an obligation? Regan provides
an argument for this view, but in rejecting Kantian support for
such a position (i.e., Kant’s complicated story about autonomy
and its relationship to the moral law), Regan opts to reach his
conclusion through a process of reflective equilibrium concerning our most settled and core intuitions (2004). Whether we do
have core, settled intuitions about basic moral obligations is not
absolutely clear, but even if it were, the extra step from intuitions about our obligations to the existence of rights is highly
contentious; many people may acknowledge that we ought not
harm non-human animals unnecessarily, or treat them in ways
inconsistent with respect for their value, but the assertion that
these facts mean they have rights against us (conceived by
Regan and others as “valid claims”) is more contentious. Few
theories of rights posit a ground for rights that extends them
to non-human beings (Feinberg 1970; Hart 1955; Mill 2001;
Rawls 1971). Those views may be wrong, but the invocation of
rights seems to be an unnecessarily contentious step in an otherwise appealing argument that non-human animals are not to
be treated in ways that violate respect for their dignity (which
is the intuitive basis for most moral rights claims).
Even setting this problem aside, however, rights-based arguments will still have a hard time explaining what is wrong with
the science-fiction chicken example. The non-sentient chickens
will not have rights (on Regan’s view, for example, they will not
be subjects of lives, and so will not have rights), and so using
them as food resources will not be a rights-issue. However one
understands rights, appealing to them does not seem to offer an
explanation for the problem in this case. In the final section of
this paper, it will be argued that the insights of a rights-based
view are salvageable without actually asserting the existence
of rights, and that a view that avoids such an assertion is more
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successful than one that does. However, discussion of another
kind of reason for vegetarianism must come first.

3. An Alternative to the Standard View from
Cora Diamond
Not all philosophers who argue for vegetarianism argue in
one of the two ways just described. One notable argument for
the possibility of vegetarianism’s being morally required (although it does not come to that definitive conclusion) is offered
by Cora Diamond. According to Diamond, if one wants to establish that vegetarianism is obligatory, one shouldn’t attempt
the sort of act-based arguments advocated by both utilitarians
and rights-theorists. The question is not whether it is wrong to
eat animals because there is some fact about them that makes
that action wrong; rather, the question is whether eating animals can be seen to be inconsistent with a proper view of them.
On Diamond’s view, the right way to argue for vegetarianism
is not to try to find some feature of non-human animals that
prohibits us from eating them (that they have interests, or that
they are subjects of lives), but rather to examine our reasons
for not eating people. According to Diamond, the reason we do
not eat people is not that they suffer, or that they have rights,
but because they are people, and people are not something to
eat (1978, 467).
On Diamond’s view, “people” is a moral category, and those
beings that fall in that category are not “something to eat.” The
question, then, is whether non-human animals should properly be thought of as a kind that is “not something to eat.” On
Diamond’s view, these categories are constructed by humans
in the context of relationships with others; there is no objective ground (subjectivity, capacity to have interests, etc.) for
membership in that category. The moral ground of prohibitions
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against eating is that we are in moral relationships with others
that preclude our eating them, and so the category “person”
includes that prohibition by nature of the relationship that creates it. Whether human beings have such a relationship with
other, non-human animals is an open question, according to
Diamond. However, she believes that it is not improper to view
non-human animals as “fellow creatures,” as illustrated by her
use of a Walter de la Mare poem,
…this indicates a direction of thought very unlike that
of the Singer argument. There we start supposedly
from the biological fact that we and dogs and rats and
titmice and monkeys are all species of animal, differentiated indeed in terms of this or the other capacity,
but what is appropriate treatment for members of our
species would be appropriate to members of any whose
capacities gave them similar interests….explicitly in
the de la Mare, we have a different notion, that of living creature, or fellow creature—which is not a biological concept. It does not mean, biologically an animal,
something with biological life—it means a being in a
certain boat…The response to animals as our fellows
in mortality, in life on this earth…depends upon a conception of human life. It is an extension of a non-biological notion of what human life is (1978, 474).
According to Diamond, the fact that non-human animals are
subjects of lives, or that they have interests, is not something
that can be read off of empirical features of the beings in question; instead, that something is seen as an “animal” signifies
that one is in a certain relationship with it, and that relationship
carries with it certain responses. Further, the fact that an animal
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has a “life” is not read off of biological facts about it either, but
is instead merely an expression of our relationship with it.
Diamond’s ultimate conclusion is that factory farming is
probably inconsistent with seeing another living thing as a “fellow creature” with a life, but that eating a non-human animal
might not be. Presumably, this is because the constructed categories that delineate moral responses are different for nonhuman animals from what they are for human beings; the kind
“animal,” though including a “fellow creature” response that
precludes the horrors of factory farming, is still of the “animal
life” category and not the “person life” category, and so our relationship to, and understanding of, that life need not preclude
eating it.
This line of argument seems to solve many of the problems
with utilitarian and rights-based arguments. Starting from the
intuitively persuasive thought that the reason we do not eat
people is not the sort of reason given by utilitarianism or a
rights-based view (who ever considered eating a human being,
but thought better of it because it would be a rights-violation?),
the argument re-imagines the moral situation from the point of
view of the moral agent, and not from facts about the object of
the act. However, the problem with this sort of view is one of
methodology. Appealing to the sorts of categories we construct,
and then reading morality off of these constructed categories,
leaves the business of morality far too arbitrary. Diamond is
careful to note that the argumentative strategy she is proposing
will not work if the person towards whom it is directed does not
have a “fellow creature” response to non-human animals; such
a person will most likely not be persuaded by an argument for
vegetarianism that rests on this response. However, she argues
that this is not a fatal flaw, since no one who rejects utilitarian-
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ism will be persuaded by Singer’s strategy of identifying nonhuman animals as morally important. If one is not convinced
that having interests is what grounds moral status, then one will
be unconvinced by Singer’s arguments that non-human animals
must not be eaten because they meet this criterion.
There is an asymmetry, however, between the assumptions
Singer asks one to make and the assumptions that Diamond
asks one to make. On Singer’s view, the facts about non-human
animals are not in question; what is in question is the normative importance of those facts. Is the capacity to have interests
what is ultimately morally salient about non-human animals?
Perhaps it is, and perhaps it is not. However, this capacity cannot be denied, and given that it is a capacity we share, its importance cannot be denied either, even if there is disagreement
about how important it is (can anyone seriously deny, for example, that it would be bad for a cat to have her paws sawed off?).
Diamond, on the other hand, rejects the idea that once certain empirical facts are granted, normative facts could easily
follow. On her view, moral responses are contextual and arise
from human category constructions. Even if it is true that a cat
feels pain, that she is a “fellow creature” is not yet established;
in order for it to be true that a being is a “fellow creature,” one
must be in a relationship with it, must see it that way. Although
she seems to argue that non-human animals are properly seen
as “fellow creatures,” nothing in the way she argues can establish that for certain. In order to establish that, there must
be facts about a being that call for a certain categorization, a
certain response, but her understanding of moral construction
rules that out. Says Diamond,
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…it is not a fact that a titmouse has a life; if one speaks
that way it expresses a particular relation within a
broadly specifiable range to titmice…Animals—these
objects we are acting upon—are not given for our
thought independently of such a mass of ways of thinking about and responding to them. This is part of what
I meant earlier when I dismissed the idea of saying of
something that whatever concepts it fell under, it was
capable of suffering and so ought not to be made to suffer… (1978, 475-476).
Given this view of how our concepts function in order to create
moral categories, it seems unlikely that someone who endorses
this view could try to appeal to the person who doesn’t have
the “fellow creature” response—for nothing in the view seems
to require that she have that response. In the absence of that
requirement, the force of the response does not seem to really
establish any sort of universal wrong.
Despite this, though, the idea that a commitment to vegetarianism is a matter of seeing non-human animals as “something
not to eat” is one that is worth preserving, and Diamond’s attempts to ground arguments for vegetarianism in our way of
seeing our “fellow creatures” is promising. However, it would
be better to avoid the arbitrary nature of the arguments, and find
a firmer grounding for an attitude-based argument for vegetarianism. In the next section, such an argument will be proposed.

4. An Attitude-Based View
Diamond’s approach gets to the heart of what is really wrong
with eating meat—what is wrong with it is not only, or primarily, that one has failed in an obligation to the animal that one
eats. What is primarily wrong with eating meat is that seeing
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non-human animals as something to eat is inappropriate, and
the subsequent eating of animals is wrong because of this.
This view of the matter sits well with the insights gained
from both utilitarian and rights-based arguments for vegetarianism. Using an animal as a mere means to further one’s interests
is at the root of what is wrong with consuming animal products,
and inflicting harm for trivial pleasure is also wrong-generating. Animal-rights advocates focus on the former as primarily grounding the impermissibility of eating animal products,
whereas utilitarians focus on the latter as the wrong-making
feature of that act. However, focusing on which feature of the
being in question generates an obligation to refrain from certain acts involving it is not the only way to understand what is
wrong with using others as means and inflicting pain on them;
as discussion of Diamond shows, these conflicting grounds of
obligation can be collapsed into an understanding of the ways
in which these actions display the wrong attitude towards an
object of moral concern. That is, focusing on the inappropriateness of seeing a non-human animal as a mere means, and
the inappropriateness of the willingness to inflict harm for a
trivial purpose, can capture the role that the insights of these
two views actually play in grounding arguments for the wrongness of consuming animal products. By locating the wrongness
of consuming animal products in the attitude of the agent, and
not in features of the action, such a view easily explains the
wrongness of even the science-fiction chicken example, as well
as the more standard cases. Instead of arguing about whether
sentience or autonomy is the feature that limits our action concerning certain creatures, we can justify these limits by appealing to the wrongness of the attitude of an agent who causes pain
or fails to respect autonomy.
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By refocusing, one can see that what is wrong with consuming animal products is that, in whatever way one acquires them
(by killing a non-human animal, by milking a non-human animal, by keeping a non-human animal in order to gather its eggs,
etc.), the treatment of the animal is inconsistent with viewing it
as having the moral status that it has. Of course, moral status is
something that one has in virtue of having certain features, but
status is not simply the possession of those features. Instead,
moral status is a matter of being of a certain kind—one is the
sort of thing that must be viewed in certain ways, and mistreatment is in large part a matter of being viewed inappropriately
given the sort of thing one is. On such a view, wrong acts are
those that display a bad attitude, where the badness of the attitude is grounded in the appropriateness of ways of seeing certain kinds of creatures. Morally salient facts about creatures
generate moral status, and acts are wrong if they express a way
of seeing the creatures that have that status in a way that fails
to recognize it.
To make this clearer, consider the difference between pulling
a cat’s teeth because one is worried about her oral health and
wants to do what is best for her, and removing a cat’s teeth for
the fun of it. In the former case, one views the cat as a being
with genuine interests, needs, and (at least basic) preferences
about how her life will go. In this case, one takes the cat to the
vet in order to respect her status as a subject, as a being that
is living a life for which one has taken some responsibility. In
the latter case, it is not clear how one views the cat, but at the
very least it seems as if one is viewing the cat inappropriately,
as an object to do with what one wishes. Even if one were to
anesthetize the cat before pulling her teeth, be vigilant about
infection, and alter her diet and her toys so that her toothless
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life is tolerable, there seems something wrong with removing
the cat’s teeth for the fun of it.
A view like Regan’s gets close to explaining why this is so:
it is a lack of respect for the cat to treat her as if her teeth were
merely a means for one’s own amusement, and as if the use
she has for them is unimportant. However, one does not have
to posit rights at all in order to explain the wrongness of this
act; even if the cat has no rights to the free and unrestricted
use of her teeth, the action (even when it does no harm) displays disrespect towards her. And this disrespect is wrong not
only for the wrong acts that follow, but wrong in the very attitude it displays. Regan wishes to give a firmer grounding to
our obligations to animals than is provided by utilitarianism,
and so conceives of a failure to respect non-human animals as
involving an injustice, a violation of rights that the animals can
claim against us. That is, he wishes to rule certain actions out
as simply impermissible because the creatures involved can demand non-performance as their due. However, given that one
can explain this wrong without appealing to the troublesome
notion of rights, it seems better to retain the core moral insight
and drop the appeal to rights. Even without the idea of rights,
there is a robust wrong that occurs in the case of pulling a cat’s
teeth for fun—that is, one views (and subsequently treats) a
non-human animal in a way that is inappropriate to the kind of
thing that it is. Moral status can generate prohibitions against
ways of seeing creatures (and the actions that those attitudes
lead to) without having to generate rights against certain kinds
of treatment, and the argument from respect paves the way for
that without need for the extra appeal to rights.
Contra Diamond, however, the appeal here to “what kind
of thing an animal is” is not a matter of how we happen to see
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it; “what kind of thing an animal is” is not merely a construction, a categorization that carries with it certain responses (and
which is shaped by those responses). A non-human animal is a
particular kind of thing as a matter of fact, and one is morally
required to see, and respond to, the kind of thing a creature is
in ways that are appropriate to its kind. According to this view,
morality is ultimately a matter of viewing, and responding appropriately, to the world; one’s actions are a good sign of how
one views the world, but they are not ultimately the basis of
moral evaluation, since the wrongness of the act of treating another inappropriately ultimately rests in the inappropriate view
that drives the action. Although full argument for this agentcentered view is beyond the scope of this article, such a view
can explain moral evaluation in general, and so (as is the case
with both utilitarianism and rights-based views) provides an
argument for vegetarianism that is continuous with arguments
against harming our fellow human beings.
This view endorses veganism because most non-human animals are the sorts of things that are subjects of the morally relevant kind. They lead their own lives from a privileged perspective (they alone know what it’s like to be them), and this means
that we must view them as the self-guided creatures that they
are. To see them otherwise, to see them as merely resources
for one’s use, is to willfully ignore a morally salient feature
of their experience. Non-human animals are, as Regan puts it,
subjects of lives, and ignoring this subjectivity, or thinking that
it is unimportant in the face of one’s own subjectivity, is to
have an inappropriate attitude towards what is a fundamentally
morally important experience. It is important to note here that
the argument is not that all moral obligations are obligations of
respect; the claim is simply that being self-guided is the feature
of experience that gives one moral status, and wrong acts are
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those that display an attitude that is inappropriate in the face of
this fact (that is, that fails to see the creature in a way consistent
with that fact).
This way of understanding wrongness can also explain what
is wrong with ignoring the pain of a non-human animal, or
thinking that its pain is unimportant in the face of one’s own.
Here, Singer’s insights are apt—it is atrocious to think that the
pain of another living thing is unimportant in the face of one’s
own desires. But what is atrocious is not just the behavior that
that thinking engenders, nor is it the fact that such thinking engenders an attitude likely to bring about bad behavior. The attitude itself is already morally wrong, whether bad behavior
follows it or not, because it is a failure to see another living
creature as having moral status; it is a failure to see another living creature as more than an object for one’s own use. Singer’s
attempts to explain the wrongness of certain acts by claiming
that they engender attitudes that lead to further bad behavior
adds an unnecessary step to the argument, for the attitude can
be seen as wrong in itself. And this is in fact more intuitive; if
we take Singer’s view, one does no wrong if one enjoys watching a film of a cow being tortured, apart from making oneself
more likely to torture cows oneself. On the view endorsed here,
however, enjoying a film in which a cow is tortured is already
wrong, even if one never goes on to compound that wrong by
torturing an actual cow.
The reason that veganism is obligatory on this view is that it
is not necessary for human beings to consume animal products
in order to survive. Non-human animals are the sorts of things
that experience and structure their own lives, and the appropriate attitude towards those lives is not only a function of what
sorts of lives the animals lead, but the sorts of lives that human
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beings lead as well. If human beings required meat to survive,
or if they required eggs and dairy products, then the appropriate
attitude towards other living things would still involve proper
recognition of their autonomy, but would also involve seeing
them as things to eat (or as producers of things to eat). Proper
respect for them would still be necessary, but what that would
require in terms of attitude and behavior would be a function of
what sorts of lives human beings had to lead.
Human beings do not need to eat meat or other animal products in order to survive, though, so it is inappropriate to see
other living creatures as things to eat. Facts about them and
facts about us make it the case that they are not things for us
to eat, and seeing them that way is inappropriate. What’s more,
veganism is explicitly and absolutely required on such a view,
since one’s attitude to a milking cow or a laying hen is no less
inappropriate than one’s attitude towards a veal calf—one
views such creatures as sources of food, as things to milk and
keep. To see the inappropriateness of such an attitude, one need
only consider how obscene that attitude would be if one took
it towards a human being. One need not consume the milk of
human beings (after a certain age), and so one should not view
human beings as mere food resources in one’s adulthood.
On such a view, not only is it wrong to slaughter a cow or
keep chickens, it is wrong to buy eggs and wrong to purchase
hamburger. Even if one does not kill the cow or keep the chicken as a food resource, buying and consuming those products
displays an inappropriate attitude toward non-human animals.
However, rather than having to posit an injustice traceable to
a particular individual in order to explain this, one need look
no further than the attitude of the purchaser. One would do the
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same wrong purchasing Tofurky, mistakenly thinking it was
once a living bird, as one would do buying an actual turkey.
A view like this one is also able to give a more satisfactory
answer to the problem raised by the science-fiction chicken
example. If one manipulates chickens in order to circumvent
what is morally salient about them, one is already doing wrong,
because one is viewing chickens inappropriately. If one takes
seriously that chickens have moral status, then trying to get
around that status by subtracting the features that help ground
it expresses a wrong attitude towards the kind of things that
chickens are (namely, things that normally have those morally
salient features). Even if the resulting chickens have none of the
features that grounded the appropriateness of certain attitudes
towards their predecessors, the act of manipulation that brought
them about clearly displays a bad attitude towards chickens,
given the kinds of things that they are. The act of manipulating
them to bring their non-sentience about is wrong because of the
attitude this displays towards chickens, towards creatures with
moral status. Though no sentient individual is harmed, and no
individuals’ rights are violated, the attitude expressed is already
wrong. And it is not too much of a stretch to think that this
would require one not to take advantage of the situation that
that manipulation brought about. That is, even if the resulting
chickens have no awareness at all, the act of trying to engineer
chickens without morally salient characteristics because one
wishes to eat them (which, given what they are, one ought not
want to do) displays a bad attitude in itself, and so this can be
seen as wrong in a way unavailable to those who rest wrongness in facts about the actual creatures involved.
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5. Conclusion
Although both utilitarian and rights-based arguments for
vegetarianism have intuitive appeal, they both have problems
that can be avoided by focusing less on the wrongness of the
actions that are prohibited, and more on the wrongness of the
attitudes involved. Taking insights from Cora Diamond’s notion of “seeing another as a fellow creature,” it becomes clear
that a wrong way of “seeing” non-human animals is at the root
of what is intuitively appealing about utilitarian and rightsbased arguments. By retaining and focusing on the importance
of those wrong ways of seeing, one can more successfully argue for the wrongness of eating non-human animals and their
products.
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